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A, B, AND C LEADS TO D (FOR DELEGATION!) 
 
Sheelagh McGuinness* 
 
A, B and C v. Ireland 
25579/05 [2010] ECHR 2032 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The case of A, B, and C v Ireland is the latest in a series of cases brought against the 
Irish Government because domestic legislation is argued to be outside of international 
human rights norms.1 The case involved three women who felt, for different reasons, 
that their rights under Articles 2, 3, 8 and 14 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR) had been breached because they had to travel to Great Britain in order 
to have a safe and legal abortion. The circumstances of the three individual women 
were different, but they belong to a large community of women who are forced each 
year to travel overseas in order to access abortion services, following what Rossiter 
calls ‘the abortion trail’.2  
 
The judgement in this case exemplifies the consequences of an approach to abortion 
regulation where a government ‘chooses’ to facilitate abortion services through 
‘delegation and doubt’.3 It does this not just by endorsing the current Irish approach to 
facilitating abortions for ‘health and well being’ reasons but also through refusing to 
push for an Article 8 based right to abortion, choosing instead to equate the question 
of the regulation of abortion services with that of answering the question of when ‘life 
begins’.4 
 
The judgement does not try to widen the category of cases when abortion would be 
legal in Ireland – abortion is currently permissible when there is a risk to the pregnant 
woman’s life (C) as distinct from to her health and well-being (A and B). Rather, it 
pushes the Irish government to provide guidance on those abortions that are already 
legal. The Court rejected the complaints of A and B for reasons which will be 
explained later. In finding that C’s Article 8 rights had been breached the Court 
echoed the earlier decision of Tysiac v Poland,5 where it was held that a State that 
permits abortion must implement a “legislative or regulatory regime providing an 
accessible and effective procedure by which the third applicant could have established 
whether she qualified for a lawful abortion”.6 Therefore, optimistically this case might 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
* Lecturer, Centre for Professional Ethics, School of Law, Keele University, UK. 
S.McGuinness@peak.keele.ac.uk 
1 A, B and C v. Ireland - 25579/05 [2010] ECHR 2032 (16 December 2010) [Hereafter “A, B, and C”]. 
For previous cases see Open Door and Dublin Well Woman v Ireland - 14234/88 [1992] ECHR 68 (29 
October 1992) This case concerned the provision of information about abortion services; Norris v 
Ireland - 10581/83 [1988] ECHR 22 (26 October 1988) This case concerned domestic prohibitions on 
homosexual activity. 
2 Ann Rossiter Ireland’s Hidden Diaspora (London: Iasc Publishing, 2009) 
3 Marie Fox and Therese Murphy ‘Irish Abortion: Seeking Refuge in a Jurisprudence of Doubt and 
Delegation’ (1992) 19 Journal of Law and Society 454-466. 
4 A, B and C at 237 
5 Tysiac v. Poland - 5410/03 [2007] ECHR 212 (24th September 2007) 
6 A, B and C at 267. 
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force the Irish government to answer three questions that were posed by Mr Justice 
McCarthy in the ‘X Case’, discussed below7: 
 
• What are pregnant women to do? 
• What are the parents of pregnant girls to do? 
• What are doctors to do? 
•  
However, it certainly does not lead to any principled liberalisation of domestic Irish 
law on abortion and the recent report of the Irish government on how it plans to deal 
with the decision suggest that the answers to these questions will not be imminent.8 
The judgement will disappoint anyone who hoped that the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) was ‘champing at the bit’9 to enshrine a Convention right to abortion, 
as one thing that is resoundingly clear in the wake of this case is that the ECHR does 
not confer a right to abortion.10 
 
In this case note I will discuss the significance of this case for Irish approaches to 
regulation of abortion services. I will also mention how the Court facilitated Ireland’s 
unusally 11  restrictive abortion laws through its application of the margin of 
appreciation.  
 
II. BACKGROUND 
In order to understand the significance of this case for Irish law on abortion, it is 
important to recognise the historical and jurisprudential context. Abortion in Ireland is 
regulated under a web of Constitutional provisions, legislation, and case law. I will 
take the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 (OAPA) as my starting point. Sections 
58 and 59 of this Act outlaw abortion with a threat of penal servitude for those who 
procure or attempt to procure a miscarriage in a pregnant woman.12 In England the 
Act has been read in light of the case of R v Bourne,13 where McNaughton J accepted 
that the existence of the word ‘unlawful’ in the Act allowed for a category of legal 
abortion. It is unlikely that this represents the law in Ireland.14 Although the issue was 
not litigated on directly, the Court in A, B, and C noted the obiter dicta of Keane J in 
the case of Society for the Protection of the Unborn Child (Ireland) Ltd (SPUC) v 
Grogan and Ors: 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Jennifer Schweppe ‘A, B and C v. Ireland: How to Respond.’ 
http://www.humanrights.ie/index.php/2011/01/14/a-b-c-v-ireland-how-to-respond/ (Accessed June 27th 
2011) 
8 ‘ACTION PLAN A, B, and C v. Ireland Application no 25579/2005, Grand Chamber judgment 16th 
December 2010, Information submitted by the Government of Ireland on 16th June 2011’ 
http://www.dohc.ie/press/releases/2011/20110616.html (Accessed June 25th 2011) 
9 Paolo Ronchi ‘A B and C v Ireland Europes Roe v Wade still has to wait’ Law Quarterly Review 
(Forthcoming) 
10 A, B, and C at 214. 
11 Unusual in comparison to regulation in other jurisdictions that have ratified the Convention.  
12 Offences Against the Person Act 1861 ss. 58 and 59 
13 [1939] 1 KB 687 
14 James Kingston, Anthony Whelan and Ivana Bacik, Abortion and the Law, (Round Hall Sweet and 
Maxwell, Dublin, 1997) Chapter 1. 
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“… the preponderance of judicial opinion in this country would suggest that 
the Bourne approach could not have been adopted … consistently with the 
Constitution prior to the Eighth Amendment.”15 
 
Sections 58 and 59 of the OAPA were reaffirmed in the Health (Family Planning) Act 
1979.16  
 
The next major legislative provision that should be noted is Article 40.3.3 of the Irish 
Constitution. This was the 8th amendment to the Irish Constitution and states that: 
 
"3° The State acknowledges the right to life of the unborn and, with due 
regard to the equal right to life of the mother, guarantees in its laws to 
respect, and, as far as practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate that 
right." 
 
This provision came about as a result of unease at the idea that abortion might fall 
within the sphere of Constitutional privacy rights as happened in the USA in Roe v 
Wade. 17  It has generally been interpreted as a strictly anti-abortion provision, 
notwithstanding that it is not framed as such, and rather imposes a positive obligation 
on the State to vindicate and protect the right to life of the unborn. What ‘the equal 
right to life’ amounts to in practice has not been further explicated although there 
have been a number of cases where the Article is examined and it is to these I will 
turn next. 
 
1992 was an important year in the development of abortion regulation in Ireland 
because of the coincidence of the X Case, and the ratification of the Maastricht 
Treaty, which I discuss below.18 Whether or not a consensus existed on the legality of 
abortion prior to 40.3.3, X made clear that there is a category of legal abortion in 
Ireland.19 In X, a 14-year-old girl was pregnant as a result of rape. Her parents sought 
advice on whether tissue from the foetus could be used in evidence against the alleged 
rapist. The police referred the case to the Attorney General who stated that the girl 
should be prohibited from travelling to Britain to obtain an abortion. The case 
eventually went to the Supreme Court, which ruled that: 
 
“if it is established that there is a real and substantial risk to the life, as 
distinct from the health, of the mother, which can only be avoided by the 
termination of her pregnancy, such termination is permissible.”20 
 
In the wake of the X case there was a further referendum to amend 40.3.3. Three 
questions were put to the Irish people: 
 
1) Whether suicide should be removed as a ground for legal abortion 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 [1989] IR 753 
16 Health (Family Planning) Act 1979 s.10 
17 Roe v. Wade (410 US 113 (1973)) 
18 Christa van Wijnbergen ‘Ireland and the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty’ in Finn Laursen and 
Sophie Vanhoonacker (eds) The Ratification of the Maastricht Treaty: Issues, Debates and Future 
Implications (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht; 1994) 
19 Attorney General v. X. [1992] 1 I.R. 1 
20 Ibid at 37. 
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2) Whether women should have the freedom to travel to another jurisdiction to 
obtain an abortion 
3) Whether there should be freedom of information within Ireland about abortion 
services in other jurisdictions. 
 
The first was rejected and the other two were passed, meaning that 40.3.3 now 
contains provisions to protect the right of Irish women to access information about 
abortion services abroad and also to travel to obtain those services. In 2002 the Irish 
voters rejected another amendment that would have tightened the prohibition on 
abortion by removing suicide as a ground for legal abortion.21 The decision in X has 
been reaffirmed in a number of cases, most notably the C case in 1997, which 
involved a 13-year-old girl who was pregnant as a result of rape and travelled to 
England to have an abortion. 22  
  
In summary then, since the X case there has been a category of legal abortions in 
Ireland. However, to fully understand abortion law in Ireland it is not enough simply 
to examine cases and statute; it is crucial to consider the severe government inertia on 
the issue. In the X Case McCarthy J. stated that: 
 
“[t]he failure of the Legislature to enact the appropriate legislation is no 
longer just unfortunate; it is inexcusable.”23 
 
This statement has been echoed by other judges most recently in the case of MR v 
TR.24 So while it has been clear since X that abortion is lawful when the life of the 
pregnant woman is threatened (including when the threat to life is from suicide) there 
has been no further clarification as to what this means in practice. This is despite the 
calls from the courts, as well as from civil society groups,25 government committees,26 
and even the Council of Europe Commissioner on Human Rights27 for legislation on 
the issue. How often abortion occurs in Ireland is unknown because the government 
does not collect figures on this, although it does so for women who travel to the UK 
for abortions.28 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Attorney General v. X. [1992] 1 I.R. 1 
22 A and B v. Eastern Health Board, Judge Mary Fahy and C, and the Attorney General (notice party), 
[1998] 1 IR 464 
23 Attorney General v. X. [1992] 1 I.R. 1 at 147. 
24 Roche v. Roche and Ors [2009] IESC 82 
25 See, for example, the Irish Council for Civil Liberties policy document on abortion legislation, The 
Need for Abortion Law Reform in Ireland: The Case Against the Twenty-Fifth Amendment of the 
Constitution Bill, 2001. (Dublin: ICCL; 2002). 
26 Report of the Constitution Review Group. Dublin: Stationery Office; 1996. Fifth Progress Report: 
Abortion. (Dublin: Stationery Office; 2000). 
27 ‘European Human Rights chief hits out at lack of abortion laws here’ The Independent 
http://www.independent.ie/national-news/european-human-rights-chief-hits-out-at-lack-of-abortion-
laws-here-1363521.html (Accessed June 25th 2011). This visit was in the wake of Parliamentary 
Assembly Council of Europe Resolution 1607 (2008) ‘Access to safe and legal abortion in Europe’ 
http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta08/ERES1607.htm#1. For a more 
recent criticism see ‘Coalition urged to clarify law on abortion’ The Irish Times 
http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/ireland/2011/0606/1224298469050.html (Both accessed June 
25th 2011) 
28 ‘Ireland: Abortion Limits Violate Human Rights’ http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2010/01/28/ireland-abortion-limits-violate-human-
rights (Accessed June 15th 2011)  
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So what are women to do if they find themselves pregnant in Ireland and wish to 
terminate the pregnancy? They can go to the Courts and seek a declaration that a 
termination is justified if they feel they meet the criteria set out in X and wish to have 
the termination carried out in Ireland. As noted in A, B, and C, judges have expressed 
their unease at the idea that the Courts should be considered as “some kind of 
licensing authority for abortions”.29  And even if a declaration is granted because of 
the ambiguity surrounding the status of legal abortion provision it is unclear whether 
an abortion would happen within the State.30 Other than (and probably along with) 
going to the Courts, women can travel overseas to access safe and legal abortion 
services. 
 
In taking a case to the ECtHR, A, B, and C wished to demonstrate that Irish legislation 
breached their Convention rights. Although the Irish Constitution is the highest and 
most binding form of legislation in Ireland, the ECHR is internationally binding on all 
States that have ratified it. The ECHR was enshrined in Irish domestic law through 
the European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003, sections 3 and 4 of which bind 
the executive and judiciary to consider the ECHR when carrying out their functions.31 
 
III. THE CASE 
 
A. Facts and Issues for the Court 
 
On the 15th of July 2005 'A', 'B', and 'C' lodged their complaint against the Irish 
Government with the ECtHR. All three women had had to travel to Great Britain to 
access a safe and legal abortion.  The facts of the case are as follows: 
 
A became pregnant unintentionally. She was a recovering alcoholic and had children 
in the care of state. In the year leading up to her pregnancy she was trying to improve 
her personal circumstances and regain custody of her children. She felt that she would 
be unable to cope with another child so after delaying the abortion by three weeks and 
borrowing from a moneylender she travelled to England to have an abortion. A felt 
she had to travel “alone and in secrecy without alerting social workers and without 
missing a contact visit with her children”.32  
 
B had become pregnant unintentionally, even after having taken the morning after 
pill. Two doctors warned B that she risked an ectopic pregnancy. She travelled to 
England for an abortion, although she knew at the time of travel that the pregnancy 
was not ectopic. She did not feel she was ready for a child.  
 
C was recovering from cancer when she became pregnant unintentionally. She was 
unable to find a doctor to determine whether the pregnancy posed a risk to her health 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 A. and B. v. Eastern Health Board [1997] IEHC 176 as per Geoghegan J. at 15 noted in A, B, and C 
at 258. 
30 This ambiguity is well illustrated in the C Case mentioned above where although the Courts held that 
C met the criteria for abortion set out in X, C in the end travelled to the UK for an abortion which was 
paid for by the Irish government. See Lisa Smyth ‘Guest Post: Smyth on A,B and C’ 
http://www.humanrights.ie/index.php/2010/12/22/guest-post-smyth-on-ab-and-c/ (Accessed June 
27th 2011) 
31 European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003 
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/2003/en/act/pub/0020/index.html (Accessed June 15th 2011) 
32 A, B and C v. Ireland at 15. 
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or life. Furthermore, she had undergone tests related to her cancer treatment that are 
contra-indicated during pregnancy. Upon her return to Ireland C suffered 
complications of an incomplete abortion. She alleged “that doctors provided 
inadequate medical care. She consulted her own GP several months after the abortion 
and her GP made no reference to the fact that she was no longer visibly pregnant”.33 
 
Although the situations of the three women were markedly different, they have two 
features in common, which they share with many of the women who must travel to 
abroad to have an abortion: first, delay due to organisational issues, especially 
arranging finance; second, secrecy and uncertainty, which can often jeopardise 
continuity of care and further impact on well-being. 
 
The ECtHR accepted that the Article 8 rights of all three applicants were engaged: 
 
“While Article 8 cannot, accordingly, be interpreted as conferring a right to 
abortion, the Court finds that the prohibition in Ireland of abortion where 
sought for reasons of health and/or well-being about which the first and 
second applicants complained, and the third applicant’s alleged inability to 
establish her qualification for a lawful abortion in Ireland, come within the 
scope of their right to respect for their private lives and accordingly Article 8. 
The difference in the substantive complaints of the first and second 
applicants, on the one hand, and that of the third applicant on the other, 
requires separate determination of the question whether there has been a 
breach of Article 8 of the Convention.”34 
 
The question for the Court was whether any infringement constituted a breach of 
Article 8, or whether it fell within the State’s margin of appreciation. It was on this 
issue that the distinction between A and B as opposed to C crystallised. The Court 
distinguished the situation of A and B from C as follows: 
 
The first two applicants principally complained under Article 8 about, inter 
alia, the prohibition of abortion for health and well-being reasons in Ireland 
and the third applicant’s main complaint concerned the same Article and the 
alleged failure to implement the constitutional right to an abortion in Ireland 
in the case of a risk to the life of the woman.35 
 
The distinction is important, as it was clear that the Court did not wish to further 
liberalise the law on abortion in Ireland. Rather they decided that the Irish 
government needed to implement an infrastructure to facilitate legal abortions within 
the State. A and B were travelling to have an abortion for ‘health and well-being’ 
reasons, and their abortions would not be legal within the State. C, however, was 
travelling to have an abortion because she feared that the pregnancy constituted a risk 
to her life; this fell within the category of legal abortions in Ireland. A and B’s claims 
were dismissed, as although their situations were “psychologically and physically 
arduous” the Court found: 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 A, B and C v. Ireland at 26. 
34 A, B and C at 214. 
35 A, B and C v. Ireland at 3. [emphasis added] 
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“… that the impugned prohibition in Ireland struck a fair balance between 
the right of the first and second applicants to respect for their private lives 
and the rights invoked on behalf of the unborn.”36 
 
 
C, on the other hand, had a right to have a legal abortion and the lack of legislative 
framework prevented her from exercising this right. Therefore her claim was upheld. 
Smet summarises the decision as follows: 
 
“The Court concluded that the uncertainty generated by the lack of 
legislative implementation of Article 40.3.3 had resulted in striking 
discordance between the theoretical right to a lawful abortion in Ireland on 
grounds of a relevant risk to a woman’s life and the reality of its practical 
implementation. Article 8 had thus been violated in the instant case.”37 
 
The decision can therefore be seen to be a logical and conservative follow-on from 
the decision in Tysiac v Poland.38 In this case a visually impaired Polish women could 
not access an abortion when a pregnancy posed a risk to her health through further 
deterioration of her sight. In Poland abortion is permissible when the health of a 
pregnant woman is endangered provided a doctor issues a certificate to verify its 
necessity. The Court found that Tysiac’s Article 8 rights had been breached. The 
judges in A, B, and C drew heavily and extensively from the judgement in that case.  
There are, however, some issues that merit further consideration. 
 
B. Margin of Appreciation 
 
One aspect of the judgement that is worthy of particular examination is how the 
majority of the Court applied the margin of appreciation in A, B, and C. Contrary to 
the arguments put forward by the Irish government, the Court found that there exists a 
wide consensus across Europe on the permissibility of abortion, noting that only three 
of the States which have ratified the Convention have more restrictive legislation than 
that found in Ireland.39 Although usually consensus serves to narrow the margin of 
appreciation, the Court did not “consider that this consensus decisively narrows the 
broad margin of appreciation” afforded to Ireland on abortion.40 The reasons for this 
are twofold. Firstly, the Court considered that abortion could not be disentangled from 
the question of when life begins, which, as noted in Vo v France41, is an issue about 
which there is no consensus.42 Secondly, it was noted that abortion is an issue that is 
still subject to much sensitivity and controversy in Ireland. On this latter justification, 
Paolo Ronchi suggests, that the Court risks allowing “European consensus and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 A, B, and C at 241. 
37 Stijn Smet ‘A., B. and C. v. Ireland: Abortion and the Margin of Appreciation’ 
http://strasbourgobservers.com/2010/12/17/a-b-and-c-v-ireland-abortion-and-the-margin-of-
appreciation/ (Accessed June 15th 2011) 
38 Tysiac v. Poland - 5410/03 [2007] ECHR 212 (24th September 2007) 
39 A, B, and C at 235. 
40 A, B, and C at 236 – it should be noted that there were some dissenting judgments on this point. 
41 Vo v France, 53924/00 [2004] ECHR 326 (8 July 2004) 
42 A, B, and C at 237. 
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harmonising role of its jurisprudence to be the handmaiden to what in one Member 
State is a strongly held moral view”.43 
 
C: The Will of the People 
The Court rejected the view that the will of the Irish people had changed since the 
insertion of Article 40.3.3 (as was alleged by A and B).44 Recent polls45 indicate a 
liberalising of views on the permissibility of abortion, but the Court did not consider 
that "the limited opinion polls on which the first and second applicants relied … are 
sufficiently indicative of a change in the views of the Irish people, concerning the 
grounds for lawful abortion in Ireland.”46 Furthermore, the Court was influenced by 
the Irish Government’s insertion of ‘anti-abortion’ clauses in the Maastricht and 
Lisbon Treaties, which they took as evidence that Irish attitudes to abortion have not 
liberalised since the insertion of Article 40.3.3: 
 
“In any event, the Government disputed the applicants’ suggestion that the 
current will of the Irish people was not reflected in the restrictions on abortion 
in Ireland: the opinion of the Irish people had been measured in referenda in 
1983, 1992 and 2002. Its public representative had actively sought, with 
detailed public reflection processes including extensive consultation, to 
consider the possible evolution of the laws and the recent public debates as to 
the possible impact of Maastricht and Lisbon Treaties resulted in special 
Protocols to those Treaties.”47 
 
These clauses were born of a fear that Europeanization could lead to abortion being 
forced on the Irish people.48 How the clauses came about is far from straightforward: 
in reality they are not simply the result of a majoritarian attitude on abortion but rather 
of political horse-trading to appeal to anti-abortion special interest groups in order to 
gain pro-Treaty majorities. As mentioned above, 1992 was an important year in the 
development of abortion law in Ireland. It was in this year that Irish voters had a 
referendum on the Maastricht Treaty. It was also the year in which the X Case brought 
abortion to the forefront of the Irish psyche. Prior to the X Case the Irish government 
drafted Protocol 17 of the Maastricht Treaty, which restricted the ability of Irish 
women to use Community law to over-ride the Irish Constitutional protection 
afforded to the unborn.49 The Protocol was drafted prior to the Treaty being put to the 
Irish people and prior to the decision in X in order to ‘head off’ the possibility of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Paolo Ronchi ‘A B and C v Ireland Europes Roe v Wade still has to wait’ Law Quarterly Review 
(Forthcoming) 
44 A, B, and C at 222-226.. 
45‘ Three-quarters of population favour liberalisation of abortion laws in Ireland’ 
http://www.ifpa.ie/eng/Media-Info/News-Events/News-Events/Three-quarters-of-population-favour-
liberalisation-of-abortion-laws-in-Ireland; ‘Survey: 60% in favour of legal abortion ‘ 
http://www.irishexaminer.com/home/survey-60-in-favour-of-legal-abortion-110224.html  (Both 
Accessed June 15th 2011);  
46 A, B, and C at 226. 
47 A, B and C at 183. 
48 For a detailed discussion of the link between abortion and cultural identity see Ruth Fletcher ‘Post-
colonial Fragments: Representations of Abortion in Irish Law and Politics’ (2001) 28 Journal of Law 
and Society 568–89 
49 It states: “Nothing in the Treaty on European Union, or in the Treaties establishing the European 
Communities, or in the Treaties or Acts modifying or supplementing those Treaties, shall affect the 
application in Ireland of Article 40.3.3 of the Constitution of Ireland. 
http://europa.eu/abc/treaties/archives/en/entr3.htm (Accessed June 28th 2011) 
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Catholic Church and special interests groups campaigning “against the Maastricht 
Treaty on the ground that European law is in danger of over-riding the provisions of 
Article 40.3.3”.50 The advent of the X Case precluded the possibility that abortion 
would not be an issue in the discussion of the Treaty.  
 
However, Protocol 17 should not be taken as conclusive evidence that the majority of 
the population at the time were against abortion. Consider van Wijnbergen’s summary 
of reasons for voting yes in the referendum on Maastricht: 
 
“A survey prepared on behalf of the Dublin Office of the European 
Commission indicated that economic issues were the most salient factors 
influencing a positive vote, with employment being the top issue in the 
voter’s mind, followed closely by the economy of the country and 
financial aid for Ireland. On the other hand, the sensitive matters singled 
out in the campaign, women’s rights, abortion, and neutrality, were the 
most prominent among the anti-Maastricht voters.”51 
 
Many of both those who were in favour of more liberal abortion laws and those who 
wished for more restrictive laws were against ratifying Protocol 17. And it is worth 
noting that Protocol 17 had, in the wake of the decision in X, to be accompanied by a 
‘Solemn Declaration’ that it was the intention of the Contracting States: 
 
“that the Protocol shall not limit freedom to travel between Member States 
or, in accordance with conditions which may be laid down, in conformity 
with Community law, by Irish legislation, to obtain or make available in 
Ireland information relating to services lawfully available in Member 
States.”52 
 
The Court seems to rely on this Protocol and Protocol 35 of the Lisbon Treaty (which 
is essentially cut and pasted from Maastricht) as evidence against the argument that 
the will of the people had changed.53 This is at best a questionable argument which 
provides a shaky foundation for an already shaky application of the margin of 
appreciation.54 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Christa van Wijnbergen ‘Ireland and the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty’ in Finn Laursen and 
Sophie Vanhoonacker (eds) The Ratification of the Maastricht Treaty: Issues, Debates and Future 
Implications (Dordrecht; Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1994) at 184. 
51 Christa van Wijnbergen ‘Ireland and the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty’ in Finn Laursen and 
Sophie Vanhoonacker (eds) The Ratification of the Maastricht Treaty: Issues, Debates and Future 
Implications (Dordrecht; Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1994) at 188. 
52 http://europa.eu/abc/treaties/archives/en/entr3.htm (Accessed June 27th 2011) 
53 Treaty of the European Union 
http://www.dfa.ie/uploads/documents/EU%20Division/EU%20Reform%20Treaty/consolidated%20eu
%20treaties%20in%20english%20as%20amended%20by%20reform%20treaty%20.pdf at 408 
(Accessed June 27th 2011) 
54 See further: Christa van Wijnbergen ‘Ireland and the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty’ in Finn 
Laursen and Sophie Vanhoonacker (eds) The Ratification of the Maastricht Treaty: Issues, Debates 
and Future Implications (Dordrecht; Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1994) and the comments of 
Professor William Schabas at http://humanrightsdoctorate.blogspot.com/2010/12/european-court-of-
human-rights-ruling.html (Accessed June 27th 2011) 
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Although the Court was concerned with current opinion within the Irish population, 
there is some reason to believe that the grounds for abortion have liberalised since X.55 
In 2006 and 2007 two cases came to the public attention: the D Case and Miss D 
respectively.56 In the first of these a woman was pregnant with twins; one of whom 
died and the other had a condition not compatible with life outside the womb. She 
travelled to England to have an abortion and then brought a case to the ECtHR. 
Counsel for the Irish government argued that D had not exhausted domestic routes 
and would have been able to seek a declaration from the Irish courts had she applied. 
The Court agreed with the Irish government and dismissed the complaint as being 
inadmissible.57 In 2007 Miss D, who was in the care of the State, was pregnant with 
an anencephalic foetus. The Health Services Authority, who was entrusted with the 
care of Miss D, challenged her right to travel to have an abortion. The High Court 
upheld Miss D’s right to travel. These cases suggest that one way in which judicial 
attitudes to abortion has liberalised is with regard to serious foetal abnormality, as in 
neither case was the life of the pregnant woman threatened. This suggests that a new 
category of legal abortion has been created. How this will work in practice is difficult 
to ascertain in the absence of legislative guidance. 
 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
So what might we expect from the Irish government in the wake of A, B, and C? The 
government is currently made up of a coalition of the traditionally conservative Fine 
Gael party and the more socially liberal Labour party. This coalition was formed after 
the decision in A, B, and C and both (unsurprisingly) had different approaches to the 
decision in their manifesto.58 They stated the following in their Programme for 
Government: 
 
“We acknowledge the recent ruling in the European Court of Human Rights 
subsequent to the established ruling of the Irish Supreme Court in the X-Case. 
We will establish an expert group to address this issue, drawing on 
appropriate medical and legal expertise with a view to making 
recommendations to Government on how this matter should be properly 
addressed.”59 
 
This is a very familiar response and did nothing to quell the worries some have about 
continuing legislative inertia on the issue. Healy, speaking about a statement from the 
Taoiseach (prime minister) Enda Kenny on the issue, says the following: 
 
“Such a political response sounds unsettlingly familiar. In 1999, the then 
Fianna Fail led government produced the Green Paper on abortion… the 2002 
referendum attempted to roll back the ruling in the X Case (which would have 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Barbara Hewson ‘Ireland’s Miss D: a ‘bizarre dispute’ 
http://www.abortionreview.org/index.php/site/article/186/ (Accessed June 15th 2011) 
56 Barbara Hewson ‘Ireland’s Miss D: a ‘bizarre dispute’ 
http://www.abortionreview.org/index.php/site/article/186/ (Accessed June 15th 2011) 
57 D v Ireland - 26499/02 (27 June 2006) 
58 Morgan Healy ‘Irish Women Politicians and Abortion: Hope for change after the ECHR ruling’ 
http://www.humanrights.ie/index.php/2011/01/10/irish-women-politicians-and-abortion-hope-for-
change-after-the-echr-ruling/ (Accessed June 15th 2011) 
59 Máiréad Enright ‘A, B and C v Ireland: Update’ http://www.humanrights.ie/index.php/2011/04/05/a-
b-c-v-ireland-update/ (Accessed June 15th 2011) 
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disallowed suicide as a legal means of procuring an abortion), a tactic that 
was rejected by the electorate. That was the last time the Irish government 
attempted to ‘deal’ with the issue of abortion, leaving women and doctors in 
the dark in terms of when abortion is permissible in Ireland.”60 
 
Whether we can expect to see the end of legislative inertia on this issue is unlikely 
given the plan of action submitted by the government on June 16th 2011. It is clear 
from this that in the wake of the judgement there will be no quick or direct response 
to the ruling. The action plan includes the following: 
 
12. It is intended that the Expert Group will be established by November 
2011. 
13. Following the recommendations from the Expert Group, proposals will 
be drafted and transmitted to Government for approval.  
 
14. An Action Report will be filed outlining the Expert Group’s detailed 
terms of reference, membership and meeting schedule by the end of 
2011.61 
 
The Irish government has a long history of fudging the issue of abortion;62 and the 
committee to be formed in November will be one of many which have discussed the 
issue of abortion in Ireland.63 Ideally (or optimistically?) the ruling will push the 
government into providing answers to the questions outlined above, thus providing 
clarity for both doctors and pregnant women on when abortions can legally be 
performed and accessed in the State. As well as empowering women in regard to 
when and from whom they can access legal abortions, guidance from the State would 
help the medical profession. As noted by the Court: 
 
“… there is no framework whereby any difference of opinion between the 
woman and her doctor or between different doctors consulted, or whereby 
an understandable hesitancy on the part of a woman or doctor, could be 
examined and resolved through a decision which would establish as a 
matter of law whether a particular case presented a qualifying risk to a 
woman’s life such that a lawful abortion might be performed.”64 
 
Irish doctors currently work with little certainty and high levels of political pressure. 
Patricia Lohr, medical director of the British Pregnancy Advisory Service, succinctly 
captures the problematic status quo: 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Morgan Healy ‘Irish Women Politicians and Abortion: Hope for change after the ECHR ruling’ 
http://www.humanrights.ie/index.php/2011/01/10/irish-women-politicians-and-abortion-hope-for-
change-after-the-echr-ruling/ (Accessed June 15th 2011) 
61 ‘ACTION PLAN A, B, and C v. Ireland Application no 25579/2005, Grand Chamber judgment 16th 
December 2010, Information submitted by the Government of Ireland on 16th June 2011’ 
http://www.dohc.ie/press/releases/2011/20110616.html (Accessed June 25th 2011) 
62 ‘Anniversary Blognival: Hanafin on Human Rights and Reproduction’ 
http://www.humanrights.ie/index.php/2010/08/20/anniversary-blognival-hanafin-on-human-right-bio-
ethics/ (Acessed June 25th 2011) 
63 For a summary of these see A, B, and C at 62 – 88. 
64 A, B,and C at 253. 
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“As doctors we’re concerned at the needless burden of additional risk caused 
by treatment delays. You don’t have to be medically qualified to understand 
that the Irish abortion ban risks women’s physical health, requires abortions 
to be performed later than is necessary, and creates serious emotional upset 
for women at an already stressful time.”65 
 
Any action taken by the government is likely to be hindered and complicated by the 
current political and economic uncertainty in Ireland.66 It has been reported67 that the 
Department of Health and Children, within whose remit this issue falls, is much 
under-funded and will have to choose between legislation in the area of abortion or in 
the area of assisted reproduction (another area where there is evidence of government 
inertia68). 
 
Often the Irish approach to abortion is tritely described as an Irish solution to an 
Irish problem. This oversimplifies and ignores the broader strategy of delegation 
that takes place in jurisdictions worldwide and is typified in this case by the ‘Irish’ 
solution of delegation being facilitated through a mirrored European delegative 
approach. Fox and Murphy summarise the situation as follows: 
 
[I]ronically, the 'Irish' solutions bear an intriguing resemblance to world-wide 
'solutions'. Around the world, political careers lurch precariously, and 
'passing the buck' becomes the solution when the personal becomes political, 
especially if the personal in question is abortion. It seems that there is nothing 
quite like it to bring out depoliticization by delegation strategies or the 
seeking of 'refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt'.69 
 
The Court, through its questionable use of the margin of appreciation and by 
focusing on narrow examples of the views of the Irish population, has endorsed a 
system where those like A and B are forced to continue to travel in their thousands 
each year, under shrouds of secrecy and shame, to Britain and elsewhere to access 
safe and legal abortion. And of course such a system relies on the mobility of those 
women and presumes a cosmopolitanism that is undermined by the existence of ash 
clouds70 and national borders. In 2009 customs in Ireland ‘seized 1,216 packs of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Patricia Lohr as quoted in in Mairead Enright ‘A,B, and C v. Ireland starts today’ 
http://www.humanrights.ie/index.php/2009/12/09/a-b-and-c-v-ireland-starts-today/ (Accessed June 15th 
2011) 
66 For an interesting discussion of this issue see Ciara Staunton ‘As Easy as A, B and C: Will A, B and 
C v. Ireland Be Ireland’s Wake-up Call for Abortion Rights?’ (2011) 18 European Journal of Health 
Law 205-219.   
67 ‘Minister must prioritise laws on either abortion or fertility’ 
http://www.irishexaminer.com/ireland/kfojaukfmhid/rss2/#ixzz1PLVYuzzn (Accessed June 15th 2011) 
68 See Sheelagh McGuinness and Sorcha Ui Chonnachtaigh ‘Implications of Recent Developments in 
Ireland for the Status of the Embryo’ (2011) 20 Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 396 – 408. 
69 Marie Fox and Therese Murphy ‘Irish Abortion: Seeking Refuge in a Jurisprudence of Doubt and 
Delegation’ (1992) 19 Journal of Law and Society 454-455 
70 ‘Irish women need cash not ash!’ Abortion Support Network: Annual Report 2010 
http://www.abortionsupport.org.uk/files/2011/01/ASN_2010_Annual_Report.pdf (Accessed June 15th 
2011) 
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illegal abortion drugs.’71 Concern has also been expressed about illegal abortions 
taking place within the State.72 These abortions are a necessity for those women for 
whom travel is not just difficult but impossible.73 If one such woman were to bring 
a case would the ECtHR accept that current legislation falls within the margin of 
appreciation? Travel in these circumstances would not merely be ‘psychologically 
and physically arduous’: it would not be an option. Would the Irish Government’s 
‘choice’ to deal with abortion through allowing the provision of information and 
travel when travel is not possible still fail to breach Article 8 rights?  
 
The strong opinions of the dissenting judgments, and the government’s apparent 
procrastination, suggest that this is an issue that will be revisited. But for now at 
least it seems that delegation (if not doubt) will remain. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 ‘Customs seized 1,216 packs of illegal abortion drugs in 2009’ 
http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/frontpage/2010/1026/1224282004957.html (Accessed June 15th 
2011) 
72 ‘Customs seized 1,216 packs of illegal abortion drugs in 2009’ 
http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/frontpage/2010/1026/1224282004957.html; ‘Concern on illegal 
Irish abortions’ http://www.irishhealth.com/article.html?id=7940 (Both Accessed June 15th 2011) 
73 Mary Gilmartin ‘Abortion and the Politics of Mobility: Gilmartin on A, B and C.’ 
http://www.humanrights.ie/index.php/2010/12/23/abortion-and-the-politics-of-mobility-gilmartin-on-a-
b-and-c/ (Accessed June 15th 2011)  
